Interrupted Work Careers by Jacob Mincer & Haim Ofek









We are grateful to the National Science Foundation and the
Sloan Foundation for their support. The research reported
hereis partofthe NBER's research program in Labor
Economics.Any opinions expressed are those of the
authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic




The quantitative effects and even the existence of "human capital
depreciation" phenomena has been a subject of controversy in the recent
literature. Prior work, however, was largely cross—sectional and the
iotgitudina1 dimension, if any, was retrospective. Using longitudinal
panel data (on married women in NLS) we have now established that real
wages at reentry are, indeed, lower than. at the point of labor force with-
drawal, and the decline in wages is bigger the longer the interruption.
Pnother striking finding is a relatively rapid growth in wages after
the return to worh. This rapid growth appears to reflect the restoration
(or "repair") of previously eroded human capital. The phenomenon of "dep--
reciation" and "restoration" is also visible in data for immigrants to the
United States. However, while immigrants eventually catch up with and
often surpass natives, returnees from the non—market never fully restore
their earnings potential.
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I. Introduction
Interruptionof a work career, especia1lyrif it is1enghy, can be expected
toreduce a person's earning power. The quantitative effects and even the
existence of this "human capital depreciation" phenomenon have been a subject
of controversy in the recent literature.1 Prior work, however, was largely cross-
sectional, and the longitudinal dimension, if any, was limited to retrospectively
reported duration of past interruptions.
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Using NLS longitudinal panel data on wages of married women, we are now
able to establish the existence of depreciation phenomena more firmly. We
observe that real wages at reentry are on the average lower than at the point of-labor
market withdrawal, and the decline is bigger the longer the interruption. If wage
setbacks due to interruptions were attributable solely to foregone growth of
transferable ("general") human capital wages of returnees would be lower than
wages of stayers, but not lower than their own wages at exit. Wages at reentry
would be lower than at exit to the extent that capital specific to the last job
was lost by separating. But if this were the case, the decline in wages would not
depend on the length of the interruption.3
i-See especially Mincer &Polachek(1974 and 1978), Sandell &Shapiro(1978),
Corcoran (1978), and Corcoran &Duncan(1979).
2We did. not explore work interruptions of men in the present study. They tend t
be infrequent and quite short. The longer ones are usually a matter of health,
schooling, or the military. See Corcoran and Duncan (1979) for a more detailed
discussion of sex differences in work interruptions.
3Our direct evidence contradicts the conclusions of the Corcoran-Duncan study to
the effect that "labor force withdrawals do reduce wages because work experience
is not being accumulated, but there is no additional penalty due to depreciation
of skills" (Corcoran and Duncan, 1979, p. 18). Their study utilizes a different
data set (PSID) and does not exploit longitudinal information on wages.2
Although interruption periods typically mark sharp declines in earning
power, there is also a relatively rapid initial growth in wages after the
return to work. It is rather surprising to find that returnees from the non-
market appear to incur greater job— investments upon return to the market than
do stayers of the same age and education levels who just changed jobs, although
the returnees may invest more after than before the interruption.
One interpretation of this wage "rebound" phenomenon is restoration or
"repair" of the previously eroded human capital, on the assumption that reconstruction
of occupational skills is more efficient, that is less costly, than new construction
of human capital. In effect, the rate of dc1ine in the rental value of the
depreciated stock is greater than its rate of "physical" depreciation. This
is because the market productivity of the eroded stok is greatly reduced even
if only small parts became defective. It may take relatively little effort to
replace or to repair the defective parts, and once accomplished the rental value
rises to its normal rate.
Put in terms of the Ben-Porath model of production of human capital (1967),
the erosion of human capital reduces its market productivity more than its
productivity as an input in its own reproduction. As indicated, lack of homogeneity
or of complete divisibility of human capital may be the source of such "non-
neutrality".
The fact that wages grow rapidly upon return to work suggests that different
estimates of depreciation rates can be obtained depending on the period
of observation. The estimate is smaller if wages of returnees are observed years
after the interruption spell than immediately after it. The distinction
between the short and long run may account for some of the variation in findings
reported in the literature.3
The phenomenon of depreciation and restoration of humancapitalis not
restricted to intermittent workers. An interesting example is the economic
experience of international migrants. Recent studies of wages of immigrants
to the U.S. reveal comparable patterns of decline and increase in occupational
status before and after their arrival in the U.S.4 We review some of these
findings in the light of ourhypothesisin the last section of the paper.
II. The Interrpted Earning Profile: AWorkingScheine
A highly simpiUied graphic of thana1ys1s that follows is
shown in Figure 1. Age—earning profiles for a continuous worker and an inter-
mittent worker are given by the straight line J1L, and by the kinked line
ABCDEFG, respectively. For simplicity it is assumed that the intermittent
worker experiences only one interruption, which lasts only one period of time.
We may thus distinguish four typical phases in the work and wage history of
such a worker: a pre-interruption period (AB), the interruption (BCDE), a
restoration period (EF), and a post restoration period (FG).
More generally, interruptions may be repetitive or unique, unexpected or
planned, or at least vaguely anticipated. A spectrum of such patterns can be
found in work histories of married women (Mincer & Polachek, 1974). If the
interruption is anticipated, the pre-interruption period may show a relatively
flat wage profile (segment AB rather than JK in Fig. 1) which reflects lower
rates of investment in human capital. Work prior to interruptions occasioned
by planned family formation is, or used to be, a typical example.







In the presentation of the second phase, the interruption itself, we show
wages at the reentry point (DE) to be below wages at the point of labor force
withdrawal (cB). This finding can already be seen from a preliminary inspection
of the NLS data. Table 1 reports average hourly wage rates immediate].y before
the interruption, and immediately after reentry, for groups consisting of the
same individuals at the two points. (Obviously, such comparisons of wages at
different points in time are possible only with longitudinal data). It is evideit
that reentry wages fall short of withdrawal wages, and that the gap increases
with the duration of the interruption. This further indicates that the lower
wages earned by intermittent workers are not only a result of lost experience
during the interruption and less investment during the pre-interruption periods,
but also as a result of deterioration of earning power due to non—use.
Another noteworthy feature of Table 1 are the lower pre—interruption wages
of workers who interrupt for longer periods. If intermittoncy is anticipated
or repetitive, the lower pre-interruption wage is a consequence of lesser investment
in human capital. More generally, an upward slope in the lifetime supply of
labor predicts that lower wage workers will interrupt their work careers for longer
periods and more frequently. In the cross—section data where the distinction
between prior and subsequent wages is not available, it can be argued that the
negative relation between interruptions and wages is really a supply effect of
(prior) wages rather than the effect of interruption on (subsequent) wages.
The longitudinal data clearly establish the latter effect, while they are
consistent with the separate reality of labor zipply effects.
The period immediately after the interruption, the third phase, is assoc-
iatedwith a rapid 'process of wage growth. As we infer once again from a
preliminary inspection of data, this time in Table 2, a rapid restoration process
of earning power takes place (roughly) throughout the first five years after6
Table1
Withdrawal and Reentry Wage Rates By the
Length of the Interruption Period
(1967 prices)
NLSPanelof Married Women
Ages 30—44 in 1967
Years of nonparticipation 0 1-2 3-4 5-6
withdrawal hourly wage rates($) 2.2781.92 1.70 1.73
reentry hourly wage rates ($) 235a1.75 1.46 1.27
number of observations 931 128 141 104
a$2.27 and $2.35 are average hourly wage rates for continuous workers
in 1971 and 1972 (1967 prices), respectively.reentry. We further note in Table 2 that the rapid wage growthduring that phase
isassociated with accumulation of job tenure. (It appears however from our
subsequent analysis that the tenure related wage growth accounts for thelesser
part of the observed wage progress). The growth in wages of returneesshould
eventually level off and settle at a rate similar to that of continuous workers,
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or lower, if further interruptions are anticipated.This point marks the
beginning of the fourth and last phase of the process outlined above.
Some aspects of the interrupted earning profile can be parameterized and
estimated. In what follows, the short-run and long-run effects of nonparticipation
and ,inFigure 1) and the long, run effect of experience (R are first estimated
on the basis of retrospective data; and then, reestimated along withthe short-
run effect of experience (y) and tenure (T)from panel data.
III. Estimations from Retrospective Data
All the working estimators in the following analysis' are essentially special
cases of the earning function
(1) Ln(w) =s+ +ye1+h0+€hi+
wherethe logarithm of wages Ln(w) is specified as a function of two pairs of
experience—nonexperience variables: past and current labor force participation
6
(e0 and e1, respectively); past and current nonparticipation (hand h1, respectively).
We may thus interpret the coefficients p and y aa the long-run and short-run
effects of participation;andas the long-run and short-run effects of
nonparticipation. All these effects are controlled in Equation (1)
5The parallelism of the last phase (of FG to KL in Figure 1) should, strictly speaking,
hold for dollar profiles, if beyond F intermittent workers invest the same amounts as
continuous workers. In Figure 1 wages are drawn in logarithms, so the parallelism
denotes somewhat lesser investments by intermittent workers.
6The precise definitionS.USed in the-cQnstructiQn Qf' these varapls r:e0 Years
of participation prior to the most recent labor force withdrawal; el= years of
participation after the most recent entry;h0= years of nonparticipation prior to the
most recent entry; h1= years of nonparticipation after the most recent exit.8
Table 2
Hourly Wage Rates of Intermittent Workers By
Current Experience and By Job Tenure
YearsSince Job Hourly Number
last Tenure WageRate of
Interruption (inyears) (1967prices) Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 .9 $2.61 101
2 1.2 2.75 238
3 1.7 2.78 156
4 2.8 2.94 148
5 2.9 3.10 209
6 3.6 3.07 120
7 4.6 3.23 83
8 4.5 3.16 789
for schooling s, and for a vector x of "other" variables to be discussed later on.
Wages, of course, are not observable for individuals currently out of the
labor force, except at the point of reentry, when current experience is still
almost zero. Estimation at reentry points is possthle with longitudinal data
because individuals observed at their labor force withdrawal and reentry points
are identifiable.
Let the subscript T denote the timing of the most recent labor force reentry
(termination of the interruption period) for an intermittent worker. Then,
Equation (1) becomes
(2)Lrl(wT) =.s+ e0 + h0 + .h1 + U,XT
because e1 =0.This particular specification enables us to estimate the long-
run effects of prior experience (e0) and of prior interruptions (h0) as well as
the short-run effect of the just completed interruption (hi). Note, however, that
the reentry point occurs at different calendar times for different individuals,
and thus the observations must be aligned (according to T) and appropriately
adjusted for chronological differences such as inflation and age.
(a) The long-run effects
Equation (2) has beem fitted to the NLS (mature women 1966—1974) data, and
the results are reported in Table 3. There are two major findings. First, the
long—run effects of market experience and nonexperience are both statistically
significant in the predicted direction. These further indicate that experience
and nonexperience have not only lagged effects on wages, but also that these
effects persist throughout and last beyond spells of labor force withdrawal, which
typically involve new jobs and new employers.•19
I-
Table3.
EarningFunctions Aligned Across Labor Force Reentry Points and Adjusted
forRetrospective Experience—Nonexperience Variables a
Sample I I II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S .057 .052 .037 .037
(8.49) (7.85). (2.74) (2.74)
h1
—.076 —.060 —.033 —.045
(9.23) (6.95) (1.97) (2.39)
—.006 —.006 —.011 —.010
(2.08) (1.90) (1.87) (1.75)
e .018 .018 .020 .022
(2.47) (2.42) (1.49) (1.62)
e2 —.00027 —.00038 —.00096 —.00096

















const. 4.52 4.56 4.69 4.79
.19 .24 .05 .08
N 1485 1485 612 612
aFor definitions of variables, means, and standard deviations, see
theglossary and the suu*nary of statistics in the appendix.Quantitatively, we find in the long-run between .6 and 1.1 percent decline
in wages per year of nonparticipation (h0), depending on whether the estimates
are derived from the sample including women with zero years of current interruptions
(sample I, col. 1,2), or the sample confined to women with stricly positive
current interruptions (sample II, col. 3,4) .'Similarly,a year of experience
(e) results in a long-run increase in wages (calculated at the mean) ranging
between .4 percent (sample II, col. 3,4), to 1.2 percent (sample I, col. 1,2). It
should be emphasized that all these estimates represent partial effects: the
long—run effect of non—participation is estimated holding experience constant,
and the long-run effect of experience is estimated holding nonparticipation constant.
It follows that in order to evaluate the total effect of work interruption the
twoeffectsshould be summed up. Thus, the total cost of a year outside the labor
force ranges between 1.5 percent (=1.1 +.4,for sample II) to 1.8 percent (=.6 ÷
1.2, for sample I) of wage decline in the long-run.
(b) The short-run effect of nonparticipation
The second major finding is that the cost of nonparticipation is substantially
higher in the shortrun. The short-run effect on wages of current nonparticipation
(h1) is estimated to range between 3.3 and 7.6 percent per year depending on the
specification and the sample used. Actually, the 7.6 percent figure is an over—
statement. since it includes the effect of foregone tenure, and the latter raises
wages of stayers by 1.6 percent to2.2 percent per year (2.2 percent in the
first year of job tenure according to the quadratic form in Table 7).Thus,
growth of tenure accounts for a smallpartof the short—run wage rebound, which
is by definition equal but opposite in sign to the estimated short-rundepreciation
7
For a description of thevarioussamples used, see footnotes to Table 1—A,
Statistical Appendix.12
coefficient.
(c) The nature and length of the interruption spell
We note that interruptions associated with layoff (LYOF), ill health (HLTH),
and migration (MIG) result in greater than average depreciation. The nature of
these differences is not explored further in this paper. However, these and
other events which often cause withdrawals of women from the labor market are
directly related to the duration of the interruption spell by the regression results
reported in Table 4. Included in this estimation are all the NLS respondents who
have experienced a complete interruption spell within the survey period (1966-
1974). While the average interruption is 2.7 years long (with a standard
deviation of 1.6 years), the findings indicate that child bearing (BAB) is
associated with interruption significantly longer. Shorter than the average are
the interruptions associated with divorce (Dlv), layoff (LYOF), and unemployment
(UNEM).The duration of interruptions associated with the occurence of marriage
(MAR), ill-health (HLTH), and migration (MIG) seem to differ little from the
average.
We further note that the duration of the interruption is inversely related
tothe level of education. This is consistent with a positively sloping life-time
labor supply function. It is also coiisisteit with previois findings that the
depreciation rate increases with the level of education (Mincer & Polachek, 1974,
Tables 5 and 6; also Mincer & Polachek, 1978, Tables 1 and 2)8, thereby deterring
the more educated from lengthier episodes of non-participatic.
8Corcoran & Duncan (1979) did not find any relation between the depreciation rates
and occupation in the Michigan Income Dynamics. They do not report comparisons
by education level.Table 4















aFor glossary of variables and sununary of statistics (means
and standard deviations), see Statistical Appendix.14
IV. Estimations from Panel Data
(b) Reestimating the short-run effects
So far, the effects of nonparticipation have been estimated partly on the
basis of retrospective data.9 In this section we dispense with retrospective
data. To this en&we replace the retrospective experience—nonexperience variables
(e0, h0) by information on pre-interruption wages available in the panel data.
In this instance the specification of the earning function involves the following
steps:
Let the subscripts V and T denote the years of labor force withdrawal and
reentry associated with the most recent interruption. Evaluated at point V the
original earning function (1) becomes:
(3) Ln(w) =s+8e+h0+
sinceboth e1= 0 and h1= 0. Substituting (3) into (2) we obtain
(4) Ln(wT) = + h1+
(xT_xV)
where=1. Alternatively, we may subtract (3) from (2) to obtain
(5) Ln(wT) -Ln(wV =h1+(xT_xV)
Deterininistically, (4) and (5) are equivalent. Stochastica].ly, they differ
because of differences in the error term. Both specifications permit estimation
of the short—run effect of interruption,€, without a need to resort to retro-
spective data. Instead, they make more effecient use of the current data: wages
at the most recent points of withdrawal and reentry (wv and wT), the duration of
the most recent interruption (h1), and recent changes in "other"variable,(xT_xV).
Panel estimates of equations (4) and (5) are reported in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.
The estimates, ofare similar in both Tables and range between 5.9 and-8.9
percent. These results are coiparable and a bit higher than the 3.3 —7.6range
9Since the NLS panel started in 1967, all prior data are retrospective. Thus
e0
and h0 are largely retrospective.15
obtainedin Table 4 on the basis of retrospective data. They thus confirm and
reinforce the findings of the previous section, namely that the size of the short-
run effects of nonparticipation exceed by much the long—run effects and are
larger than any reported in previous studies.
It is worth noting that the estimate of(the coeffecient of ln w),
which was not constrained to equal 1, is much less than 1. Unless errors of
measurement in wages are large, the estimate suggests larger (percent) losses
in wages at higher wage levels, given the length of interruption.
(b) Experience and job tenure in the post interruption period
In order to analyze the process of wage growth in the post-interruption
period we now evaluate the earnings function (1) at a fixed chronological date:
the last year of the panel (1974) in our sample. Here (1) becomes
(6) Ln(w74) =s+8e + e1 + h0 + :
whereh =0 and e =e+e.Informationon tenure (TEN) available only in the
1 0 1
post—interruptionperiod, was explicitly included in the specification of (6).
Wagegrowth during the post-interruption period is the sum of the three coefficients
B++ (equa1 to the short-run effect of current experience). Equation (6)
has been fitted to the data (samples V and VI) andthe results are summarized in
Table7. Based on the results estimated by the linear form (col. 1,3), post
interruption wages tend to grow at an average rate of roughly 2.5 percent per
yearof experience. Thequadz'atic form (col. 2,4) results are somewhat higher:
3.3to 3.6 percent at the mean (which occur about9years after the most recent
interruptionfor the average respondent).
When these estimates are projected down to thefirstyear after reentry the
rateofgrowth, as expected, is much higher: between 5.8 to 6.4 percent per year.16
Table 5
Earning Functions Aligned Across Individual Labor—Force Reentry
Points and Adjusted for Labor—Force Withdrawal Wages a
Sample III III IV IV
















































































aMeans standard deviations, and definitions for all the variables
are given by the glossary and summary of statistics, in the
Statistical Appendix.17
Table 6
Regression Analysis of Labor Force Withdrawal—Reentry Wage
Differentials a





















































const. —.009 —.028 .159 .162
R2 .06 .06 .04 .05
N 1304 1304
aFor means, standard deviations, anddefinitions of variables,
see the glossary and summary of statistics (Table A—i), the
Statistical Appendix.18•
Table7
Earning Functions Aligned Across a Fixed Chronological Point (1974) and
Adjusted For Current and Retrospective Experience—Nonexperience
Var iables a
Sample V V VI VI





























































const. 4.88 4.73 4.70 4.63
R .28 .29 .25 .27
N 1015 1015 820 820
aFor nans, standard deviations, and definitions, see the glossary
and suninary of statistics (Table A—i), Statistical Appendix.19
This rate of growth of wages of women who were past the age of thirty at reentry
is almost double of the estimated rate for men (3.4%) of the same age, projected
to the outset of their working lives. (See Mincer & Polachek, 1974, Table 11).
It seems more reasonable to us to view this large difference in wage growth as a
• difference in the nature rather than in scale of the human capital investment. A
breakdown by factors indicates that in all the above cae3s j'ob tenure accounts for
less than half of the post-interruption wage growth. More than half of it can
beascribedto experience net of the effect of tenure; namely, to growth of
earningpower embodied in the worker (general training) and transferable with
him across jobs. In turn, a half or more of the latter is due to the repair of
humancapital(coefficient of e1 holding e constant).
Inaddition to the various short-run effects outlined above, equation (6)
offers reestimation of the long—run effects of experience(e) and nonexperience
(h). The findings of .4to.8for the former, and -.4 to—1.0 for the latter,
arein clear agreement with the findings obtained in the previous specifications
(Section III).
V. Some Conclusions, Conjectures, and the Case of Immigrants.
Our short and long—run depreciation rates are linear estimates, representing
the average loss of earning power due to an additional year of non-work. In
longitudinal data the negative coefficient of h1 is, indeed, evidence on the
existence of depreciation. We would expect that depreciation affects both
general and specific human capital. But, while losses of general capital increase
with theduration of absence from work, theloss of specific capital is a once
forallphenomenon due to separation from the job. This means that, if the losses
were only in specific capital, the corretly estimated marginal depreciationrates would be zero. Consequently, we may reject the notion that observed depreciation
rates are restricted to specific capital. In previous work, (Tablein Mincer
&Polachek,1978) we found that interruptions not exceeding a year had negligible,
insiginficant effects on wages. Apparently, intermittent workers lose little
in specific capital, probably because they accumulate little of it. Since we
find that wages decline as a function of duration of the interruption, what we
are observing is largely the phenomenon of depreciati-)n and restoration of
general human capital.
Although we only estimated coefficients of a linear term in the current
interruption h1 we should not conclude that the depreciation rate is independent
of the duration of the interruption. Longer periods of absence may well
accelerate losses of knowledge and skill. Beyond some point,witha substantial
part of the stocli gone, additional losses may well diminish. Of course, when
all the skill has been forgotten and lost, no further erosion is possible. We
nay expect, that if observable over a long range of interruption periods, the
depreciation rate would be a growth (decay) type fundtion (1) of duration. In
the previously referred work, (Mincer &Polachek,1978)we estimated separate
(dummy) coefficients for interruptions of one, two and three plus years, and
these showed negative coefficients increasing in size. This is consistent with
the initial (accelerating) part of the proposed fcurve.
Empirical estimation of the complete pattern of depreciation is difficult
for several reasons. Much longer panel data would be required to accoinodate
progressively lengthy interruptions. But even with very long panels, it is
unlikely that very long interruptions would be observed. This is because the
longer the stay in the non-market, the less likely the return to the market.
Although the interruption may result from an increase in the shadow wage (e.g.increased family demand) above the market wage, a long decline in the latter
(due to depreciation) may well leave it below the shadow wage even when the
shadow wage returns to its usual level. At the saute time non-market skills may
increase with non-market experience thereby raising the "normal" level of the
reservation wage.
Moreover, the longer the interruption that is observed the more likely
itis that the returnees are people whose human capital is especially durable,
whether it is a matter of personal resiliency (good memory), or environmental
(lesser changes in the field, or special opportunities that have arisen for them).
Consequently, our estimates of short and long-run depreciation, observed on
returnees (prior to 1974) only are likely to be understated. By the same token
the subsequent wage growth is probably overstated. Nevertheless, the ultimately
lower wage level of returnees compared to stayers indicates that to a sufficiently
large extent the wage rebound after interruption differs qualitatively from the
usual continuous investment trajectory.
Partial losses of human capital may result from causes other than interruption
of market work by non-market activities. An interesting example is international
migration. Skills and knowledge are not completely tranferable across frontiers.
The greater the economic and cultural "distance" between country of origin and
of destination, the greater the "depreciation" of human capital. Here "distance"
plays the same role as duration of work interruption in the case of intermittent
workers. Since not all skills are equally affected, economically motivated
migrants are likely tobe selected among the most adaptable skills and persons.
Selectivity by occupational skill, though not by personal motivation and stamina,
is likely to be weaker in extra—economic migration, as in the case of political
or religious refugees. Therefore greater losses of human capital may be experiiced
by them. This is analogous to the experience of intermittent workers: returnees
tothe market are also likely to be those who lost least by interrupting, and
greater losses, on average, can be expected when the interruption is unanticipated.22
Just as in the case of returnees to the labormarket,new immigrants initially
experience the greatest loss in human capital. This is visible in occupational
data of immigrants to the U.S. Recent studies (Chiswick, De Freitas) have
emphasized the strong upward economic mobility of migrants in', the U.S. labor
market. However, the success story in the U.S. follows an initial drop from
the immediately preceding occupational position in the country of origin.
According to the 1970 census data, 22.6% of the men arriving in the U.S. between
1965 and 1970 (and in the labor force in 1970) experienced an initial occupational
decline, as measured by major occupational categories. As expected on the basis
of "distance", the extent of decline (proportion experiencing downward mnobilit')
was 11% for immigrants from English-speaking countries, 20.5% from other
developed countries, and 25.4% from LDC's. And, according to Chiswick, the
initial decline was largest or immigrants who are predominantly refugees.
According to our interpretation of- the behavior of returnees from the
non—market, readaptation ("repair") of skills is likely to be more efficient
than new investments in human capital. The strong upward occupational mobility
of immigrants and the steep wage increases during the first half—dozen years
in the U.S. partially represent, in our view, the same "rebound" from the decline
occasioned by migration as by nonparticipation. Net of the standardizing
variables such as education, age, and others, coefficients of years of work
experience in the U.S. in immigrant earnings functions exceedthe comparable
coefficients of U.S. natives, especially at the start of U.S. experience.
We would expect that intermittent workers are lesser life-time human
capital investors than continuous workers, Their wage profiles are lower
and flatter than the profiles of contfn'i'ous workers, despite the temporary steep23
Table8
Earnings Functions of Native and Foreign-Born
White Men (In wage, 1969)
Native Men Who Entered
All Native Men The Labor Force 1960-1969 Foreign Born Men
b t b t b t
.0689 50.1 .0885 27.6 .0596 5.3
a
ea .0361 32.0 .0910 9.1 .1356 3.2





Rural —.1878 22.1 —.1100 6.3 —.0326 .9
South —.1313 15.3 —.1190 7.0 —.2113 8.5
Single —.2252 20.7 —.1645 9.2 —.2080 8.9
R2 .162 .187 .138
n 32,933 7,629 5,760
Source 1970 Census of Population, as shown in De Freitas (1979).
=Yearsof schooling in the U.S.
=Yearsof schooling abroad
ea=Yearsof U.S. labor market experience
ef =Yearsof foreign labor market experience24
growth of wages following an interruption. In contrast, economic migrants may
well be persons with greater capacity or opportunity than comparable natives at
10
both origin and destination, and greater investors in their human capital.
It is tempting, therefore, to interpret the steeper growth of wages of
immigrants than of comparable natives as evidence of their larger investments in
human capital (Chiswick). It is ourview,however, that the initially lower
wages of immigrants compared to natives and the following initial rapid growth
arein part a reflection of "depreciation and restoration" in the rental price
of the immigrant's human capital aswellasofthe larger scale ofinvestmentin
its stock which is evident as a lifetime proposition. But even with larger
investments than those of natives, immigrants from the most "distant" countries,
because they suffer the greatest initial differential (e.g. some Asians, and others
from LDC's) do not overtake natives in wages, as do migrants from the more
industrialized and culturally closer countries. (See Chiswick, 1978).
Can we distinguish short-term "rebound" from long-term scale of invest-
ment? For one, the former implies greater concavity of earnings than the
latter. Secondly, strength of the rebound should be less sensitive to age
whichotherwise sharply reducesthe volume of investment. Evidence in favor
ofthe existence of th&"restor4tion" phenomenon may be inferred from Table 8.
It provides a comparison of 1970earnings functions of immigrantstothe U.S.
with those of rative men who entered the labor force between 1960 and 1969.
The linear coefficient on the U.S. labor market experience of immigrants is
50% larger than the corresponding coefficients of native entrants into the
labor force, despite the fact that, onarrival,immigrants were, on average,
10 Ifgreater ability raises both opportunity costs of and the returns to migration,
say by an equal proportion, in the presence of direct costs of migration which are
independent of ability; migràtthn.mutbe more *ofitable for the tnoè able
worker. (The argument is adopted from Becker (197 ,p. )).Evenif abilities
did not differ, migration is likely to be selective of people for whom specia
opporufljties beckon at destination.25
in their second decade of working life. The deceleration of wages (coefficient
of the quadratic term) is over twice as strong for immigrants. Moreover,
the initial growth of wages after arrival in the U.S. is only slightly smaller
for older than for younger immigrants: it declines only .1% per year (coefficient
of interaction term) rather than .8% per year as would be indicated by the
quadratic term of their U.S. earnings profile. At this pace of decline, initial
U.S. wages of 50-60 year old immigrants still grow more rapidly than wages
of U.S. young labor force entrants. It seems apparent that efficient readaptation
of the previously acquired human capital stock is an important part of the immigrant
success story, as it also seems to be a condition of the reabsorption into the




s: Years of schooling.
(b) Wages
w0: Hourly wage rates at (or immediately before)
the most recent labor force withdrawal.
w1: Hourly wage rates at (or immediately after)
the most recent labor force reentry.




e0: Years of work experience accumulated
prior to the most recent interruption.
e1: Years of work experinece accumulated
since the last interruption.
e: Total years of work experience (e=e0÷e1)
TEN: Years of job tenure.
(d) Nonexperience
h0: Years of nonparticipation prior to the most
recent work interruption.
h1: The duration of the most recent work
interruption (in terms of years).
h: Total years of nonparticipation
(hh0+h1)
(e) "Other Variables"
MAR: Dummy variable =1 if marriage took placeduring
or immediately before the most recent interruption.
DIV: Dummy variable1 if divorce took place during
or immediately before the most recent interruption.BAB: Dummy variable =1if a new child was born during
or immediately before the most recent interruption.
HLTH: Dummy variable1 if a health problem arose during
or immediately before the most recent interruption.
MIG: Dummy variable1 if migration took place during or immediately
before the most recent interruption.
LYOF: Dummy variable =1if a layoff occurred during or immediately
before the most rece t interruption.
UNEMP: Dummy variable1 if an episode of unemployment occurred
during or immediately before the most recent interruption.
RCLL: Dummy variable =1if after the most recent interruption
the respondent returned back to the same job held before
that interruption.28
Tablei-A
Summary of Statistics:Means, and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses)















































































LYOF:(dummy) .102 .144 .089 .142 ——— ——
tJNEMP:(dummy) .086- .101 .086 .107 ———
MAR:(dummy) .032 .026 .04]. .046 ———
DIV:(dummy) .071 .062 .070 .054 ———
BAB:(dummy) .122 .183 .116 .204
HLTH:(dummy) .182 .221 .188 .252
MIG:(dummy) .182 .232 .172 .252
N: 1485 612 1304 373 1015 820
029
Footnote a to Table 1—A in the Statistical Index
a. Sample I: Includes all white women married spouse present (at least in
part of the survey period) who were either intermittent workers or continuous
workers, and, in addition, satisfied the following conditions. Only those
intermittent workers are included which have experienced a complete spell
of labor force interruption within tle survey period (1966-1974) followed by a
spell of gainful employment for which reported wage rates are available in
the data. Continuous workers are included providing their 1972 wage rates
are reported in the data. Sample II : is a subsample of I which includes only
intermittent workers, and excludes continuous workers Sample III: includes
all white women married spouse present (at least in part of the survey period)
who were either intermittent workers reporting wages before and after at least
one complete spell of labor force interruption within the survey period; or,
alternatively, were continuous workers reporting wages in both years, 1971 and
1972. Sample IV: is a subsample of III which includes only intermittent workers,
and excludes continuous workers. Sample V: includes all white women: (regardless
of marital status) who have reported wages in 1974. Sample VI: is a subsample
of V which includes only married women husband present.30
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